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TRANSBOUNDARY WILDLIFE LAWS AND TRAFFICKING:
THE PLIGHT OF THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT IN MALAWI
AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
EMILY SCHENNING†
I. INTRODUCTION
The African elephant (Loxodonta Africana) is one of the most
iconic and arguably one of the most important species of the Afri-
can savanna.1  It has, however, seen a serious decline in population
densities across the continent, due mainly to poaching and illegal
ivory trade.2  This devastation of elephant populations has signifi-
cant implications, not only for the elephant, but for savanna habi-
tats and many other species that rely on elephants.3  Moreover, the
transboundary nature of the species implicating several countries
and their laws in the conservation of single populations of ele-
phants makes the issue of elephant conservation even more
difficult.4
Focusing on Malawi and its border states, the elephant is af-
forded very different levels of protection in Southern Africa.5  In
2017, according to the Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species (CITES), Tanzania had a quota (amount of tusks
allowed to leave the country) of one-hundred elephants’ tusks,
Zambia had a quota of one-hundred and sixty, Mozambique had a
quota of thirty-eight, and Malawi had a quota of zero.6  Some Afri-
can countries also differ in the way the elephant is ranked as an
† J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law; B.S., Environmental Science, 2016, Towson University.
1. See infra notes 32-56 (noting elephants are considered keystone species and
ecosystem engineers who shape their habitat).
2. See infra notes 20-31 (stating elephant population has dropped from nearly
two million to only 350,000 and that poachers kill up to 30,000 elephants each
year).
3. See infra notes 32-56 (noting elephants are important for ecosystem health
and other species).
4. See infra notes 46-56 (noting elephants are highly mobile species).
5. See infra notes 195-213 (showing elephants are listed differently on CITES
among their range states and some countries allow trophy hunting while others do
not).
6. See UN Environment, Loxodonta Africana, SPECIES PLUS (2017) https://www
.speciesplus.net/#/taxon_concepts/4521/legal (listing amount of elephant tusks
allowed to be taken from Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, and Malawi).
(39)
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endangered species under CITES.7  An elephant crossing these ar-
bitrary country borders faces different threats depending on the
differing laws of each country.8
In Malawi, the government partnered with an independent
conservation organization (African Parks) to manage wildlife and
national parks after poaching and lack of management nearly deci-
mated local wildlife populations.9  Poverty and government corrup-
tion continue to be major drivers of elephant poaching in the
country, with poor local attitudes toward wildlife and isolation of
local people from national parks contributing further to the issue.10
The almost nonexistent recourse for those who violate wildlife laws
making poaching a profitable enterprise is also concerning.11
The driving force behind poaching in many African nations is
the demand for ivory in international markets.12  CITES attempts to
control the international sale of elephant parts, but significant ille-
gal markets still exist in many Asian countries and the United
States.13  The Lacey Act is an important legal tool in the United
States used to combat the importation of elephant trophies illegally
obtained from foreign jurisdictions.14  Under the Trump adminis-
tration, the African elephant faces uncertainty as the ban on ele-
phant trophies from Zambia and Zimbabwe has been lifted twice
within five months.15
7. See infra notes 195-213 (noting that not all of Africa lists elephants as ap-
pendix I species).
8. See id. (finding four nations in Africa list elephants as appendix II species
while thirty-three list elephants as appendix I species).
9. See infra notes 101-112 (explaining Malawi entered into twenty five year
agreement with African Parks for African Parks to take over management of some
national parks because poaching had largely destroyed many of them).
10. See infra notes 57-77 (noting there is high incidence of corruption among
ministry heads and yet they have great power; also finding many Malawians having
to choose between degrading environment and feeding their families).
11. Id. (stating penalties for poaching are meager, with fines about forty
dollars).
12. See infra notes 20-31 (noting illegal ivory trade is single greatest threat to
elephants due to poaching and booming international ivory market).
13. See infra notes 195-214 (noting CITES is leading and only international
agreement to control international wildlife trade and that China and United States
have largest markets for ivory).
14. See infra notes 228-78 (explaining Lacey Act allows United States to prose-
cute those who have violated wildlife laws in other countries).
15. See infra notes 278-307 (noting Trump lifted ban on importation of ele-
phant trophies from Zimbabwe and Zambia in November 2017 and again four
months later after reversing his decision to lift ban due to public outcry).
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The largest ivory markets in the world are in Asia, with China
leading the way.16  In early 2018, China passed a ban on the legal
ivory market, but the efficacy of the law has yet to be seen amid
serious enforcement issues.17  One concern is that the market will
merely shift to other Southeast Asian countries where there are still
legal ivory markets.18  With elephant populations dwindling, coordi-
nation among countries from Asia to Africa is needed to save the
elephant from extinction.19
II. THE INTERNATIONAL ILLEGAL IVORY TRADE
The illegal ivory trade is the single greatest threat to the ele-
phant due to poaching and a booming international ivory market.20
Poaching and the demand for ivory dwindled the African elephant
population to less than half a million individuals.21  In the 1900s,
estimates suggest there were as many as twelve million elephants in
Africa; now there are less than 350,000.22  According to recent re-
ports, up to 30,000 elephants are killed each year.23  The illegal
wildlife trade is roughly worth between eight billion dollars and ten
billion dollars in revenue each year.24  Figure 1 shows the range of
16. See infra notes 214-341 (noting China and United States have largest mar-
kets for ivory).
17. Id. (finding China passed ban on legal ivory markets but also noting that
China has had serious enforcement issues with environmental laws).
18. Id. (acknowledging that people in China are looking to neighboring
countries for ivory and that ivory markets in neighboring countries where trade is
legal are thriving).
19. See infra notes 21-24 (describing decline in elephant populations due to
poaching).
20. See Keith Lindsay et al., The Shared Nature of Africa’s Elephants, Biological
Conservation, 215, 260-267 (Nov. 2017) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0006320717303890 (stating in some regions poaching has spurred de-
cline of elephants by nearly eighty percent and that international wildlife trade is
major crisis facing African elephant).
21. See John Sudworth, Can China’s Ivory Trade Ban Save Elephants?, BBC (Mar.
31, 2017) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-39440486 (explaining that
due to poaching there are fewer than half million elephants left).
22. See Scott Ramsey, Elephants Decline by 97% in Less than a Century, AFRICA
GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 9, 2016) https://africageographic.com/blog/elephants-decline-
97-less-century/. (stating that elephant populations have fallen from as many as 12
million in early 1900s to only 350,000 today).
23. See Jafari Kideghesho, The Elephant poaching crisis in Tanzania: a need to
reverse the trend and the way forward, TROPICAL CONSERVATION SCIENCE (Jan. 5, 2016)
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/194008291600900120 (noting
that recent reports indicate that thousands of elephants are being killed each
year).
24. Id. (stating that illegal wildlife trade is worth billions of dollars a year).
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the African elephant as of 2017.25  This is but a fraction of the his-
torical range of the species which has declined by fifty percent since
1979.26
Figure 1: The range of the African Elephant as of 2017. Yellow shaded
areas are known range while purple shaded areas are possible range areas.
Not only does wildlife trafficking threaten the existence of spe-
cies, such as the African elephant, but it also funds rebel militant
groups and organized crime.27  Money from the sale of ivory is used
by militant groups to fund war in countries like the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo.28  Funds generated through elephant poach-
25. See Species Range, Loxodonta Africana, IUCN RED LIST (2018) http://maps
.iucnredlist.org/map.html?id=12392 (Showing map of historical African elephant
range versus current range).
26. See African Elephants, WWF (2017) http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/en
dangered_species/elephants/african_elephants/ (stating range of African ele-
phant has declined by fifty percent since 1979).
27. See Bryan Christy, How Killing Elephants Finances Terror in Africa, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 2, 2015) https://www.nationalgeographic.com/tracking-ivory/
article.html (describing how Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army poach
elephants for ivory to supply war).
28. Id. (detailing how Lord’s Resistance Army of DRC smuggle ivory to fund
their conflicts).
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ing have been shown to finance known terrorist groups throughout
Africa including al-Shabaab, the Lord Resistance Army, and Boko
Haram.29  In 2013, at the annual African Development Bank meet-
ing, the President of Gabon stated:
“Today wildlife crime has become a serious threat to the sover-
eignty and stability of some of our countries.  More and more of the
profits are used to finance civil conflicts and terrorist-related activi-
ties.  Furthermore, illicit wildlife trafficking is often linked to other
forms of illegal trafficking and to money laundering.”30
Halting the illegal wildlife trade is essential for the survival of
the elephant, but also to curb terrorist groups and devastating civil
wars.31
III. THE ECOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT
The African elephant is considered a keystone species and an
ecosystem engineer, playing an especially important role in preserv-
ing the savanna ecosystem.32  It has also been shown that as much
as a third of tree species found in African forests require elephants
to disperse their seeds.33  Elephants are considered “umbrella” spe-
cies meaning they require a large tract of habitat.34  Elephants are
also water dependent animals, migrating according to rainy sea-
sons.35  Their diets vary according to precipitation levels; eating
mostly grasses in the wet season and woody plants in the dry
season.36
Second only to the human race, the elephant has more physi-
cal impact on its landscape than any animal.37  This destruction is
29. See Kideghesho, supra note 23, at 369-88 (stating al-Shabaab, Lord’s Resis-
tance Army, and Boko Haram are among those terrorist groups thought to gener-
ate significant revenue through ivory sales).
30. Id. (quoting President of Gabon, Ali Bongo, at African Development Bank
2013 Annual meeting).
31. See supra notes 20-31 (noting that up to 30,000 elephants are being killed
each year; elephant population has dropped to only 350,000 from twelve million in
early 1900’s; and that poaching helps to fund known terrorist groups and wars).
32. See Kideghesho, supra note 23 (stating elephants are critical to shaping
savanna ecosystems and thus have been termed ecosystem engineers and keystone
species).
33. Id. (noting as many as one-third of tree species depend on elephants for
seed dispersal).
34. Id. (stating elephants have also been described as umbrella species and
thus require large tracts of land).
35. See Richard Estes, THE BEHAVIOR GUIDE TO AFRICAN MAMMALS INCLUDING
HOOFED MAMMALS, CARNIVORES, PRIMATES 259-269 (University of California Press,
20th anniversary ed. 1992) (discussing elephant migration patterns).
36. Id. (discussing elephant grazing patterns).
37. Id. (discussing elephant’s environmental impacts).
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beneficial, however, to other wildlife living in the African savanna.
Elephants help create trails and wells and bring food that would
otherwise be inaccessible within the reach of smaller animals.38
Furthermore, the destruction of trees by elephants, if spread out
over an adequate range, helps promote habitat diversity and soil
turnover.39  As a result, the species is even known as “ecological
engineers.”40
The elephant has poor digestion, breaking down only forty
four percent of its food.41  This incomplete digestion helps move
seeds from where they were eaten to wherever the elephant has
traveled, promoting seed dispersal.42  An ecological study found
that amphibians and reptiles generally do better in habitats im-
pacted by elephants.43  The study compared two areas, one with ele-
phants and one without, and found that a greater diversity and
number of amphibians were present in the habitat where elephants
were also present.44  The survival of the African elephant is vital not
only for its own sake, but for the continued survival of many other
species.45
African Elephants are a highly mobile species requiring large
tracts of land and habitat to survive.46  Global climate change is in-
creasing the mobility of elephants since they now have to travel fur-
ther to find adequate water resources.47  National parks are not
large enough to contain the African elephant.48  A study published
38. Id. (describing benefits of elephant behavior and destruction).
39. Id. (describing benefits of elephant tree felling).
40. See Mark Kinver, Elephant ecological engineering ‘benefits amphibians’, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 23, 2010) http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-11607299
(stating that elephants are referred to as ecosystem engineers since many other
species depend on their habitat modifications).
41. See Estes, supra note 35 (describing elephant diets and digestion).
42. See Kinver, supra note 40 (noting that elephants’ poor digestion promotes
seed dispersal through elephant dung).
43. Id. (discussing study done in Northern Tanzania observing that areas with
more elephant damage had higher incidences of certain species of amphibians
and reptiles).
44. Id. (describing study and elements of study done in Northern Tanzania
looking at how elephants impact amphibians and reptiles).
45. See infra notes 46-56 (noting many species are dependent on elephants to
shape their habitat).
46. See Kideghesho, supra note 23 (stating elephants are umbrella species that
require large tracts of habitat).
47. See Lindsay, supra note 20 (stating global climate change is increasing vari-
ability of food and water sources, forcing elephants to travel further for resources).
48. See Arnold Tshipaet al., Partial Migration Links Local Surface-Water Manage-
ment to Large-Scale Elephant Conservation in the World’s Largest Transfrontier Conserva-
tion Area, BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 215, 46-50 (Nov. 2017) https://www.sciencedi
rect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0006320717309047 (noting elephants often
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in 2017 found that over the course of the study, twenty percent of
the elephants in question crossed the border from Zimbabwe into
Botswana.49  Transboundary migration occurred mostly during the
dry season in response to changing surface water levels.50  Most pro-
tected areas within African nations are on country borders, a vestige
of colonial rule.51  The migratory nature of the species also raises
census challenges among countries if efforts are not coordinated.52
Thus, some elephants go unreported or are double counted.53  As
seen in figure 2, Malawi’s national parks are located along its bor-
ders, further emphasizing the need for international cooperation.54
At least one transboundary elephant population in Malawi, on the
Zambia border has been identified as of 2017.55  As a result, coordi-
nated management is needed to adequately protect this population
of elephants.56
migrate out of protected areas; and finding specifically, twenty percent of ele-
phants in Hwange National Park routinely migrate out of park).
49. Id. (finding twenty percent of elephants in Hwange National Park, in
Zimbabwe, migrate out of park on regular basis).
50. Id. (stating elephant migrations in Hwang National Park mostly occur sea-
sonally in response to water levels).
51. See Lindsay, supra note 20. (stating most national parks in Africa are lo-
cated on or near national borders due to colonialism).
52. Id. (discussing migratory nature of elephants and census challenges that
occur as result).
53. Id. (stating that if census efforts are not coordinated, elephants can be
double counted).
54. See figure 2, Google Maps, GOOGLE (2018) https://www.google.com/maps
(showing Map of Malawi and its national parks).
55. See Lindsay, supra note 20 (noting population of elephants on Nyika,
Malawi and Zambia border).
56. Id. (listing Nyika elephant population on border of Malawi and Zambia as
transboundary population).
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Figure 2: Malawi and its border countries
IV. WILDLIFE LAWS OF MALAWI AND ITS BORDER STATES
A. Malawi
Elephant poaching has been and continues to be a serious is-
sue in Malawi.57  Within just twenty years the elephant population
fell by fifty percent.58  A report written by the national parks system
57. See Shelley Waterland et al., A Technical Assessment Undertaken on Behalf of
the Department of National Parks and Wildlife of Malawi, ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE RE-
VIEW, MALAWI (May 2015) https://www.lilongwewildlife.org/wp-content/uploads/
IWT-Review-Malawi.pdf (noting wildlife in Malawi are under serious threat from
poaching).
58. Id. (stating elephant populations in Malawi have been poached exten-
sively, resulting in population decline of fifty percent before partnership with Afri-
can Parks).
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of Malawi states that the risk of being prosecuted for wildlife crimes
is low yet the reward for selling ivory is high in Malawi.59  The fines
for trafficking ivory in Malawi are only about forty dollars or even
less.60
Another major issue in Malawi is that the country is often used
as a through way to transport illegal ivory.61  The park service stated
about Malawi being a transportation hub for ivory that, “Malawi is,
geographically speaking, very conveniently i.e. centrally placed for
this purpose.”62  With better wildlife trafficking legislation and en-
forcement, Malawi is in a prime position to help halt the Southern
African illegal ivory trade.63
1. Wildlife Laws of Malawi
Malawi received its independence from Great Britain in
1964.64  After gaining independence, Malawi was ruled as a brutal
dictatorship under President Banda until 1994.65  President
Banda’s government was overthrown in 1994 and a democracy was
instituted in its place.66  A new Constitution was written and
adopted in 1994 and lists environmental protection as a national
policy.67  The Constitution of Malawi does have a special provision
for environmental protections.68  The Constitution lists some of its
principles of national policy are to: (1) prevent the degradation of
the environment; (2) provide a healthy living and working environ-
ment for the people of Malawi; (3) accord full recognition to the
rights of future generations by means of environmental protection
and the sustainable development of natural resources; and (4) con-
59. Id. (stating most wildlife trafficking cases are tried in low grade courts
leading to lower fines; also, this low fine does not provide a deterrent when reward
is so high).
60. Id. (stating average fine for trafficking is about 20,000 kwacha or twenty
dollars).
61. See Waterland, supra note 57 (discussing use of Malawi as distribution and
transit hub for illegal ivory).
62. Id. (discussing prime location of Malawi as transportation hub for illegal
ivory).
63. See supra notes 57-62 (discussing wildlife trafficking in Malawi and chal-
lenges to enforcement).
64. Chikosa Banda, Professor, Lecture at the University of Malawi Chancellor
College (July 2018) (describing history of Malawi).
65. Id. (discussing how Malawi gained independence and subsequent events).
66. Id. (discussing major political events in Malawi and how President was
overthrown in 1994).
67. Id. (discussing history of Malawi constitution).
68. Republic of Malawi [Constitution] Act (1994) (including environmental
goals as principles of national policy along with gender equality, nutrition, health,
rural life and education).
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serve and enhance the biological diversity of Malawi.69  A constitu-
tional environmental right, however, is not provided in the
Constitution of Malawi.70  Thus, this national policy is not binding
on the government of Malawi.71
Although the government of Malawi is now a democracy, it still
functions like a dictatorship in some respects.72  Each department is
run by a minister, and corruption among these government offi-
cials is rampant.73  Ministers are appointed by the President and do
not need senate approval.74  These positions are highly political,
and ministers will not do anything that will jeopardize their posi-
tion.75  Corruption is also rampant among ministers.76  For exam-
ple, the Minister of the Environment has been caught selling
charcoal, an act that is highly unsustainable and illegal for
Malawian citizens without a permit.77
The controlling wildlife law in Malawi is the National Parks and
Wildlife Act of 1992, which was amended in 2017.78  The National
Parks and Wildlife Act is meant to control the illegal wildlife trade
and conserve wildlife and habitats.79  This Act states in part, “The
Director may issue to any person a permit in the prescribed form,
to import or to export, or to re-export any specimen of a game
species, protected species, or endangered species or listed spe-
cies. . . .”80  Given the prevalence of corruption among government
officials and ministers, this degree of power to hand out permits
raises concerns.81
69. Id. (describing environmental goals that are priorities of national policy).
70. See J. Kalma, Environment and development in Malawi – any balancing of inter-
ests?, BALANCING OF INTERESTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AFRICA, 219 (2012)(not-
ing there is no explicit constitutional environmental right in Malawi).
71. See Banda, supra note 64 (lecturing on Constitution of Malawi).
72. Id. (discussing politics and government of Malawi post 1994).
73. Id. (discussing structure of Malawian government and government
corruption).
74. Id. (describing structure and politics of Malawian government).
75. Id. (describing political nature of government appointments).
76. See Banda, supra note 64. (discussing government corruption in Malawi).
77. Id. (discussing illegal acts committed by government officials).
78. See National Parks and Wildlife Act (Act No. 11/1992) (Malawi) (describ-
ing statutory duties concerning national parks and wildlife in Malawi); see also Na-
tional Parks and Wildlife (Amendment) Act (Act No. 11/2017) (Malawi)
(amending National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1992).
79. See National Parks and Wildlife Act (Act No. 11/1992) (Malawi) (stating
purposes of National Parks and Wildlife Act).
80. National Parks and Wildlife (Amendment) Act (Act No. 11/2017)
(Malawi) (describing permitting duties of Director).
81. Id. (describing National Park and Wildlife Director’s power to issue per-
mits); See supra notes 72-77. (describing structure of Malawian government and
high incidence of corruption among officials).
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The Act was also amended to include tougher fines and penal-
ties, an issue with the past Act as seen in case law.82  In Republic v.
Akimu,83 a woman was found in possession of illegally obtained
ivory in 2003.84  Officials from the National Parks and Wildlife De-
partment posed as buyers of ivory and arrested Maria Akimu when
she attempted to sell pieces of ivory.85  When the officials arrested
Akimu, they were faced with hostility from her neighbors, and one
wildlife official was severely injured.86  After being convicted of un-
lawful possession of ivory under the National Parks and Wildlife
Act, Akimu was only fined six-thousand Malawian Kwacha which
translates to about eight USD.87  This sentence was the controversy
over which the case was brought before the high court of Malawi in
2003.88  The concern the Department of National Parks and wildlife
had over this low fine was that—considering the price that can be
obtained from selling ivory is significantly higher than 6,000
Kwacha—the fine will be an ineffective deterrent.89
The National Parks and Wildlife Act states in part:
Any person who unlawfully possesses or who purports to
buy, sell or otherwise transfer or deal in any government
trophy shall be guilty of an offence. . .. . .. and shall be
liable to a fine of K10, 000.00 and to imprisonment for a
term of 5 years and in any case the fine shall not be less
than the value of the specimen involved in commission of
the offence.90
The court weighed the opposing views, and placed high impor-
tance on the events that transpired during the arrest, including
when the defendant incited her neighbors to violently attack the
82. See National Parks and Wildlife Act, supra note 78 (increasing fines for
multiple wildlife trafficking crimes); see infra notes 95-100. (discussing Malawian
case where man was found guilty of wildlife trafficking, but his sentence was va-
cated due to his inability to pay fine).
83. Republic v. Akimu, Malawi High Ct. 96 (Dec. 29, 2003) (discussing case
where woman trafficked in ivory and was given tougher sentence).
84. Id. (describing events that lead to arrest).
85. Id. (describing how officers made arrest of Akimu).
86. Id. (describing violence during arrest).
87. Id. (describing holding of lower court).
88. See Akimu, supra note 83 (stating that low sentence raised concern and is
subject of this review).
89. Id. (describing concerns of the Department of National Parks and
Wildlife).
90. Id. (reciting relevant section of the National Parks and Wildlife Act of
1992). Fine for possession of and selling of ivory under the amended act is now two
million Kwacha and prison sentence of up to four years. See National Parks and
Wildlife (Amendment) Act, supra note 78.
11
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wildlife officials.91  The judges were also unmoved by the argument
that the defendant was a single mother with children to care for
and her imprisonment would cause undue hardship; finding that
she should have had them in mind when she committed the of-
fense.92  Ultimately, the court upheld the fine and gave Akimu a
one year prison sentence.93  Media pressure and fears of a poor im-
age also influenced the court to impose a higher sentence.94
In Republic v. Namputo,95 a man (Isaac Namputo) was charged
with being in unlawful possession of ivory in violation of the Na-
tional Parks and Wildlife Act and was given the maximum fine of
100,000 Kwacha (about 133 USD).96  Having been unable to pay
the fine, Namputo was imprisoned for a sentence of one year.97
The court found the fine excessive because the lower court did not
take into account Namputo’s ability to pay the fine and it was his
first offense.98  The sentence was vacated and a new sentence was to
be decided based on the defendant’s ability to pay.99  This type of
sentence reduction based on ability to pay will only encourage the
poor to poach as the consequences will be almost nonexistent.100
2. Wildlife Management in Malawi
Malawi is one of the poorest nations in Africa with a high de-
pendence on foreign aid.101  According to the UK Business Insider,
Malawi is the sixth poorest country in the world with a GDP per
capita of only $1,132.102  One of the primary wildlife aid groups
91. Akimu, supra note 83 (noting defendant was well connected to illegal traf-
ficking rings; finding this major threat to ecosystem; and stating that punishment
must be high to avoid violence).
92. Id. (finding domestic matters irrelevant during sentencing).
93. Id. (ruling of the court was to impose prison sentence).
94. Id. (noting high media coverage and public concerns over international
interests in environmental conservation).
95. Republic v. Namputo, Malawi High Ct. 78 (Jun. 21, 2007) (describing case
in which man was caught in unlawful possession of ivory and was sent to jail when
unable to pay fine).
96. Id. (describing procedural history of case).
97. Id. (discussing how defendant ended up incarcerated for possessing ille-
gal ivory).
98. Id. (discussing rationale for overruling jail sentence).
99. Id. (discussing standard for sentencing).
100. See Namputo, supra note 95 (vacating defendant’s sentence due to his in-
ability to pay fine which resulted in jail time).
101. See Norimitsu Onishi, Poverty, Drought, and Felled Trees Imperil Malawi Water
Supply, THE NEW YORK TIMES (August 20, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
08/21/world/africa/poverty-drought-malawi-water-supply.html (describing pov-
erty in Malawi and prevalence of foreign aid groups and workers).
102. Barbara Tasch, The 30 Poorest Countries in the World, BUSINESS INSIDER
(March 7, 2017) http://uk.businessinsider.com/the-25-poorest-countries-in-the-
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operating in Malawi is a conservation nonprofit known as “African
Parks.”103  African Parks is responsible for much of the wildlife con-
servation efforts (specifically involving elephants) in Malawi.104
The conservation group entered in to a public-private partnership
with the government of Malawi to take over management of a few
national parks, including Majete National Park and Liwonde Na-
tional Park.105  Before African Parks took over management of
Majete in 2003, most of the endemic species were completely gone
and locals were cutting trees for charcoal production.106  One
ranger in Majete noted a marked improvement in the state of the
park since African Parks took over management fifteen years
ago.107
African Parks took over management of Liwonde National
Park more recently back in 2015.108  Human wildlife conflicts com-
bined with serious poaching eliminated the elephant population in
the park.109  African Parks relocated 400 elephants into Liwonde
and decided to combat human wildlife conflict and poaching by
building a fence and posting guards; efforts that have seemed to
work as the elephant population in Liwonde is now over 800.110
After taking over management of Liwonde, African Parks and rang-
ers removed over 23,000 snares set by poachers.111  Now that
Liwonde’s elephant population has recovered, conservationists are
world-2017-3?IR=T/#30-senegal-gdp-per-capita-2578-2102-1 (listing and describing
thirty poorest nations in world).
103. See David McKenzie and Brent Swails, The Big Move, CNN WORLD (June
28, 2017) https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/africa/malawi-elephants-rehomed-
conservation/index.html (describing African Parks’ conservation efforts in
Malawi).
104. Id. (describing major effort to relocate 500 elephants in effort to con-
serve elephants in Malawi).
105. See Boost for Malawi’s Wildlife: African Parks Takes Over Liwonde National
Park and Nkhotakota Wildlife Reserve, MALAWI TOURISM (July 24, 2015) http://www
.malawitourism.com/pages/news/index.asp?NewsID=611 (describing partnership
between African Parks and Malawian government and subsequent impacts on na-
tional parks).
106. See Majete National Park: Overview, AFRICAN PARKS, https://www.afri-
canparks.org/the-parks/majete (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (describing state of
Majete National Park before African Parks took over management).
107. Interview with Osmund, Game Ranger, Majete National Park, in Majete,
Malawi (June 2018) (discussing how park has changed over his long time working
in Majete).
108. See McKenzie and Swails, supra note 103 (discussing African Parks’ con-
servation efforts in Liwonde).
109. Id. (describing what happened before African Parks took over manage-
ment of Liwonde).
110. Id. (describing efforts to relocate hundreds of elephants in to Liwonde).
111. Id. (describing state of park when African Parks took over management).
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moving some of the elephants to other parks in Malawi that have
dwindling populations such as Nkhotakota park.112
3. Local Attitudes Toward Wildlife in Malawi
One of the greatest obstacles to conservation, especially conser-
vation of elephants who have high economic value by way of their
ivory, is that Malawi is an extremely poor country.113  When faced
with the choice of killing an elephant for ivory and not being able
to feed their families, most Malawians would choose to kill ele-
phants.114  According to Monica Namonde, a law student at the
University of Malawi, many Malawians see wildlife more as a source
of income or food.115  Many Malawians also question “why animals
have to be more protected than people.”116
Also, Malawians are systemically excluded from enjoyment of
wildlife resources due to high park fees.117  These fees are often
more than many Malawians make in a month, making it impossible
for locals to enjoy their own natural resources.118  Smith Chaoneka,
a fourth year law student at the University of Malawi, stated that
many locals view wildlife as a source of wealth (in the form of ivory)
and place less value on wildlife in terms of tourism.119  Chaoneka
also found that due to his environmental education he now places
more value on wildlife and thinks that “wildlife [has] a right to exist
in [its] own right.”120
112. Id. (discussing success of African Parks’ conservation efforts in Liwonde).
113. See Banda, supra note 64 (discussing challenges of poverty in Malawi).
114. Id. (discussing poverty in Malawi and local attitudes toward wildlife).
115. Interview with Monica Namonde, Environmental Law Clinic Student,
University of Malawi Chancellor College, in Zomba, Malawi (July 2018) (describing
local attitudes toward wildlife in Malawi).
116. Id. (describing how Malawians feel protections of wildlife are misplaced
when many people are suffering from poverty).
117. See Banda, supra note 64 (discussing how many Malawians cannot afford
park fees that cost as much or more than monthly income).
118. Id. (discussing how high park fees exclude Malawians from enjoying
their own environment).
119. Interview with Smith Chaoneka, Environmental Law Clinic Student, Uni-
versity of Malawi Chancellor College, in Zomba, Malawi (July 2018) (discussing his
impression of local attitudes toward wildlife in Malawi).
120. Id. (describing how his own views have changed after being in law
school).
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B. Zambia
Zambia’s controlling wildlife law is the Zambia Wildlife Act of
2015.121  This Wildlife Act makes several provisions for protected
species and hunting.122  According to the Wildlife Act of 2015, any
hunting of listed protected species absent a license is prohibited.123
The Wildlife Act itself does not specify which animals are protected,
and which may be hunted with the possession of a license.124  The
Minister of Tourism and Arts determines the status of species as
protected or game species pursuant to a statutory order.125  In
2017, eighty elephants were killed as trophies in Zambia.126  This
number is likely to rise due to the reversal of the trophy ban in the
United States in March 2018.127
The Great Elephant Census found that the Southern portion
of Zambia is being particularly hard hit by poaching with elephant
populations down a staggering ninety-five percent.128  The Sioma
Ngwezi park has been especially hard hit according to the census
data.129  It was found during the census that eighty-five percent of
the elephants found in the park were already dead, as the census
counts both live and dead elephants.130  Poachers in this area hunt
elephants without any recourse due to the remoteness of the
area.131  These poachers are also able to easily escape law enforce-
ment by crossing into either Botswana, Zimbabwe, or Angola know-
121. The Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 (2015) (noting as its purpose to “wind
up affairs of Zambia Wildlife Authority”).
122. Id. (stating as its purpose to conserve ecosystems and biodiversity but
allowing in section VIII for licenses and permits to hunt wild animals).
123. Id. (noting in section VIII that any person hunting without permit com-
mits offence).
124. Id. (noting in section VIII that license is required to hunt wild animals
but not specifying any species restrictions).
125. Id. (stating in section VIII various duties of Minister).
126. See UN Environment, supra note 6 (listing quotas of elephants tusks
taken from many African Nations).
127. See infra notes 278-307 (discussing turbulent times in America for African
elephant conservation including reversal of trophy ban).
128. See Adam Cruise, Elephants Wiped Out on Alarming Scale in Southern Africa,
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (April 6, 2016) https://news.nationalgeographic.com/
2016/04/160406-elephants-wiped-out-alarming-scale-Southern-Africa/ (discussing
how Sioma Ngwezi park in Southern Zambia has become hot spot for elephant
poaching).
129. Id. (stating Great Elephant Census counts live and dead elephants to
determine carcass ratio).
130. Id. (noting census found majority of elephants in Sioma Ngewzi have
been killed by poachers).
131. Id. (noting poachers are seldom caught due to little human activity in
area).
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ing that Zambian police will not cross borders to chase them.132  A
more coordinated law enforcement effort is needed to curb poach-
ing in Southern African nations.133
C. Mozambique
Another border country to Malawi, Mozambique, has a turbu-
lent history.134  Mozambique is home to one of Africa’s most
breathtaking national parks, Gorongosa.135  Between 1977 and
1992, the country was ravaged by a deadly civil war.136  This civil
war, in conjunction with the fight for independence from Portugal
in the 1970s, led to the near total destruction of wildlife popula-
tions in Mozambique.137  Nearly ninety percent of the wildlife in
Gorongosa were killed in the conflict.138  Between 1946 and 2010,
war has impacted seventy percent of all national parks in Africa.139
Elephants are often killed in conflicts for their meat and their ivory;
the ivory being used to further fund the conflict.140  Gorongosa
park is now returning to its former glory thanks to a partnership
between the Mozambique government and the nonprofit Carr
Foundation.141
In July of 1999, the Mozambique government passed Law No.
10, the controlling wildlife protection legislation.142  Decree No. 12
132. Id. (stating poachers have “easy escape route” because poachers could
enter one of four different countries with law enforcement not chasing poachers
across borders).
133. See Cruise, supra note 128 (noting law enforcement will not cross country
borders to arrest poachers).
134. For a discussion on Mozambique’s civil war, see infra note 135.
135. See Morgan Kelly, The Ecological Costs of War in Africa, PRINCETON ENVIRON-
MENTAL INSTITUTE (January 10, 2018) https://www.princeton.edu/news/2018/01/
10/ecological-costs-war-africa (describing ecological research done in Gorongosa).
136. See Elephants of Gorongosa, PBS.ORG http://www.pbs.org/gorongosa/
gorongosa-national-park/elephants/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018) (discussing how
most elephants in Gorongosa were killed during civil war).
137. See Kelly, supra note 135 (stating that civil war in Mozambique led to
fighting in park and much dependence on wildlife for meat and income).
138. Id. (noting that civil war and subsequent hunting destroyed elephant
population in Gorongosa).
139. Id. (finding most national parks in Africa have been influenced by
conflict).
140. Id. (noting elephants were killed to support war).
141. See Rob Morley and Ian Convery, Restoring Gorongosa: Some Personal Reflec-
tions, DISPLACED HERITAGE: RESPONSES TO DISASTER, TRAUMA, AND LOSS, 129-140
(Dec. 2014) (discussing war in Mozambique and noting how Carr Foundation
helped restore Gorongosa).
142. See Eduardo Soares, Wildlife Trafficking and Poaching: Mozambique, LAW LI-
BRARY OF CONGRESS (Dec. 2012) https://www.loc.gov/law/help/wildlife-poaching/
mozambique.php (discussing Law no. 10 and legal framework of wildlife preserva-
tion in Mozambique).
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and the Penal Code are meant to enforce this wildlife law in the
country.143  The law allows for hunting and sport hunting with the
required licensing.144  The government of Mozambique is rife with
corruption and scandal, calling into question the efficacy of its
laws.145  Elephant poaching is still a major concern for
Mozambique’s elephant population; a concern the government is
ill equipped to handle.146
D. Tanzania
Tanzania lies on the Northern border of Malawi and is likewise
home to a substantial African elephant population.147  Illegal ele-
phant poaching is the driving factor in declining elephant popula-
tions in Tanzania.148  Poaching has become a major issue due to the
high demand for ivory products, poverty, unemployment, and cor-
ruption in source countries.149  Poaching has led to serious declines
in the elephant population in Tanzania.150  In 2013, there were
50,500 elephants in Tanzania, but in 2015 that number dropped to
43,521.151
Another major issue concerning wildlife trafficking in
Tanzania, is the difference in laws between mainland Tanzania and
Zanzibar.152  The laws of Zanzibar only protect and regulate the
143. Id. (explaining legal framework for wildlife protection in Mozambique).
144. Id. (noting that it is violation to hunt without license).
145. See Mozambique is floundering amid corruption and conflict, THE ECONOMIST
(Mar. 18, 2016) https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/216952
03-scandals-and-setbacks-gas-and-fishing-industries-darken-mood-mozambique
(describing corruption in Mozambique).
146. See Poachers killed half Mozambique’s elephants in five years, THE GUARDIAN
(May 26, 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/26/
poachers-killed-half-mozambiques-elephants-in-five-years (discussing government
survey that found 48% decline in elephant population in Mozambique due to
poaching in just five years).
147. See Ramsey, supra note 22 (noting Tanzania has over 40,000 elephants).
148. Id. (discussing seriousness of elephant poaching in Tanzania and East
Africa).
149. Id. (discussing why elephant poaching and illegal wildlife trade are one
of top wildlife crimes around world).
150. Id. (noting that elephant population in Tanzania dropped by sixty per-
cent by 2015 from 2009 levels).
151. Id. (discussing how elephant population has plummeted in recent years
in Tanzania).
152. See Roz Price, National and regional legal frameworks to control the illegal wild-
life trade in sub Saharan Africa, INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (Jul. 4, 2014)
http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/147-Enforcement-and-Regu
lation-IWT.pdf (noting that mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar are separate states
and environmental legislation is left to respective state).
17
Schenning: Transboundary Wildlife Laws and Trafficking: The Plight of the Af
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
56 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30: p. 39
trade in native species, thus excluding the African elephant.153
Consequently, the smuggling of elephant and other wildlife prod-
ucts through Zanzibar has become a serious problem in
Tanzania.154  The disparity between the laws of mainland Tanzania
and Zanzibar have created a legislative loophole that traffickers
have been exploiting.155  This again highlights the need for coordi-
nated wildlife laws between countries in order to avoid this kind of
exploitation of the weaker legislation.156
The Wildlife Conservation Act of 2009 is the primary law regu-
lating wildlife in Tanzania.157  One objective of the Wildlife Conser-
vation Act of 2009 is to “foster sustainable and legal use of wildlife
resources and take appropriate measures to prevent illegal use of
wildlife.”158  The Act also lists as a goal to participate in interna-
tional agreements and “co-operate with neighboring countries in
the conservation of trans-boundary ecosystems.”159  While the Act
lays out important goals for conservation, it lacks power, especially
because the judiciary is weak.160
The Wildlife Conservation Act explicitly permits licensed tro-
phy hunting.161  In 2017, Tanzania had a quota of 100 elephant
tusks from fifty elephants hunted as trophies.162  The legality of tro-
phy hunting in Tanzania has been shown to have effects on trans-
boundary elephant populations.163  In 1973, Kenya banned trophy
153. Id. (noting law of Zanzibar only protects native species to Zanzibar and
therefore not many listed CITES species).
154. Id. (noting difficulty of legislative loophole and discussing smuggling
case through Zanzibar).
155. Id. (noting need to address difference in wildlife protection laws be-
tween mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar).
156. Id. (noting difficulties of legislative loophole and need to coordinate
laws).
157. The Wildlife Conservation Act (Act No. 5/2009) (Tanz) (noting purpose
of Act is to replace previous Wildlife Conservation Act and to protect and conserve
wildlife).
158. Id. (stating under Part II objectives of Wildlife Conservation Act).
159. Id. (discussing objectives of Act that promote conservation of species
globally).
160. See Price, supra note 153 (discussing lack of training of judiciary on wild-
life crimes).
161. Wildlife Conservation Act, supra note 158 (discussing in Part IV require-
ments to obtain game hunting license).
162. See UN Environment, supra note 6 (noting amount of elephant tusks
taken from Tanzania in 2017).
163. See Virginia Morell, What Trophy Hunting Does to the Elephants it Leaves Be-
hind, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 18, 2017) https://www.theatlantic.com/science/arch
ive/2017/11/elephant-trophy-hunting-psychology-emotions/546293/ (describing
how elephant behavior is affected by uncoordinated wildlife laws).
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hunting but the practice continued in Tanzania.164  This disparity
in trophy hunting laws created issues for the elephant population
of Amboseli National Park in Kenya.165 The elephants became com-
placent due to their safety on the Kenyan side of the border and
became easy targets on the Tanzanian side of the border.166
Enforcement of wildlife laws in Tanzania is a chronic problem
both for lawyers and the judiciary.167  Most of the judiciary has little
to no training concerning wildlife crime litigation.168  Persistent de-
lays in the judicial system in Tanzania have stifled wildlife crime
prosecutions.169  Currently, there is a case concerning the smug-
gling of ivory through Zanzibar that has not yet gone into the hear-
ings stage after three years.170  A big challenge to the enforcement
of wildlife laws and subsequent litigation in Tanzania is governmen-
tal corruption.171  Even with wildlife laws on the books and penal-
ties for those who violate them, these laws will be ineffective with
the slow pace of the judiciary and governmental corruption.172
Tanzania has made some progress with the enforcement of
wildlife trafficking laws.173  The Tanzania Wildlife Authority was es-
tablished in 2014 and regulates wildlife outside of national parks.174
Border control started using dogs to sniff out illegal ivory and other
wildlife products.175  This began in 2016 and has led to the appre-
hension of twenty-six individuals smuggling wildlife products.176
164. Id. (discussing differing wildlife laws in Tanzania and Kenya).
165. Id. (describing how elephants become vulnerable when migrating across
country borders when countries have different levels of protection for wildlife).
166. Id. (stating it was observed that elephants didn’t run from hunters in
Tanzania because they didn’t expect to be shot by tourists).
167. See Price, supra note 153 (discussing lack of training of judiciary on wild-
life trafficking issues).
168. Id. (describing study conducted by TRAFFIC finding judiciary has little
knowledge of wildlife crimes).
169. Id. (noting there are often delays and frequent adjournments that lead
to derailing of wildlife crime cases even with great evidence).
170. Id. (discussing delays in ivory smuggling case through Zanzibar in its
third year).
171. Id. (noting corruption is serious issue in Tanzania).
172. See Price, supra note 153 (finding corruption to be rampant in
Tanzania).
173. Id. (discussing recent investments for enforcement of wildlife crimes in
Tanzania).
174. Id. (describing Tanzania Wildlife Authority).
175. Id. (describing canine units deployed at borders).
176. Id. (noting success of canine units at finding illegal wildlife products).
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E. Regional Agreements
Few regional agreements exist among Southern African coun-
tries that attempt to coordinate laws and goals in order to curb the
international illegal wildlife trade.177  These agreements include
the African Elephant Action Plan, the Arusha Declaration on Re-
gional Conservation and Combating Wildlife/Environmental
Crime (November 2014), and the Southern African Development
Countries Protocol of 2003.178  These regional agreements hoped
to coordinate efforts to combat the illegal wildlife trade, but they
fell short as evidenced by the differing national strategies and bur-
geoning illegal market.179
The range states of the elephant considered and adopted the
African Elephant Action Plan in 2010.180  The eight main objectives
of the action plan include: (1) reduced illegal killing of elephants
and illegal trade in elephant products, (2) maintenance of ele-
phant habitats and restoration of connectivity, (3) reduced human-
elephant conflict, (4) increased awareness of elephant conservation
and management of key stakeholders that include policy makers,
local communities among other interest groups, (5) strengthened
range states knowledge of African elephant management, (6)
strengthened cooperation and understanding among range states,
(7) improved local community cooperation and collaboration on
African elephant conservation, and (8) effective implementation of
the African Elephant Action Plan.181  The second goal of the Action
Plan (increased connectivity) cannot be achieved through African
Parks’ management style of completely fencing its parks.182
The Arusha Declaration on Regional Conservation and Com-
bating Wildlife /Environmental Crime was signed in 2014 by
Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zambia among others.183  The
177. See Price supra note 153 (discussing regional frameworks to reduce wild-
life crimes).
178. Id. (listing and describing various regional agreements to address wild-
life crimes).
179. Id. (describing regional agreements and their goals).
180. See Conservation on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, African Elephant Action Plan, Mar. 13-25 2010 (describing purpose
of agreement and parties to agreement).
181. Id. (listing objectives of this agreement between African elephant range
states).
182. Id. (stating objective two of Act is “maintenance of elephant habitats and
restoration of connectivity”).
183. See Price, supra note 153 (discussing Arusha Declaration).
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signatories to the agreement promised to take measures to combat
the illegal wildlife trade.184  Some of the measures include
[c]ollaborating in combating illegal off-take; [d]eveloping
protocols for the joint training and patrolling of wildlife
and environmental law enforcement agencies where ap-
propriate; and [c]oordinating the harmonisation of wild-
life and environmental crime enforcement and penalties,
with particular reference to elevating certain wildlife and
environmental crimes to the level of serious crimes.185
The SADC Protocol contains similar goals of harmonizing wild-
life trafficking laws in the region.186 Malawi, Mozambique,
Tanzania, and Zambia are all also signed on to the SADC Proto-
col.187  When signing the protocol, “Member States agree to policy,
administrative, and legal measures for promoting conservation and
sustainable wildlife practices within their jurisdictions.”188  “The
Protocol advocates Member States harmonise legal instruments for
wildlife, establish management programmes for wildlife, and create
a regional database of wildlife status and management.”189 Under
the SADC Protocol, members created a Technical Committee and a
Wildlife Sector Coordinating Committee were created that were
meant to improve execution of the agreement.190  They also made
some cross-border control agreements in accordance to the agree-
ment along with a few Transfrontier Conservation Areas.191  The
successful implementation of these agreements remains a major is-
sue and is key to protecting transboundary animals such as the Afri-
can elephant.192 Given these regional agreements, the knowledge
184. Id. (noting that South African Development Community and East Afri-
can Community signed agreement to improve cross border collaboration to re-
duce wildlife crimes).
185. Id. (describing measures taken in agreement to protect wildlife).
186. Id. (describing South African Development Community Protocol of 2013
aimed at harmonizing wildlife legislation in Southern Africa).
187. Id. (discussing signatories to SADC Protocol).
188. See Price, supra note 153 (describing obligations of parties to SADC
Protocol).
189. Id. (describing suggestions to member states set out in SADC Protocol to
meet goals of agreement).
190. Id. (discussing mechanisms meant to enforce SADC Protocol).
191. Id. (discussing conservation areas created across Mozambique and South
African borders and South Africa and Zambia; meant to conserve wildlife across
borders).
192. See Price, supra note 153 (noting regional agreements are under-
utilized).
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of the problem (need for coordinated wildlife trafficking laws) ex-
ists but execution remains a serious issue.193
V. CITES AND INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING LAWS
OF MAJOR IVORY MARKETS
A. CITES: Convention on International Trade of Endangered
Species
CITES controls the international wildlife trade that threatens
the survival of several endangered species.194  CITES includes three
levels of protection: Appendix I, Appendix II and Appendix III.195
Appendix II listing regulates trade of species through a permit sys-
tem while Appendix I listing bans all trade of species internation-
ally.196  During the ninth meeting of the parties, participants
amended the listing criteria so that the precautionary principle is
followed when deciding how to list a species.197 For a species to be
listed under Appendix I, the species must be currently in danger of
becoming extinct and be threatened due to international trade.198
To qualify for Appendix II listing under CITES a species must be
likely to require Appendix I listing if international trade is not regu-
lated.199  Appendix III listing is available for any country that re-
quires assistance in controlling the trade of a species and allows for
cooperation in upholding domestic trade laws.200 Once a species
has been listed under CITES it is up to individual countries and
border control to actually enforce the agreement.201  Enforcement
of CITES continues to be a major challenge as the agreement must
rely on the competence of international governments and border
control for implementation.202  CITES made steps to improve en-
forcement, most notably by directing the Secretariat “to pursue
closer international liaison between the Convention’s institutions,
193. Id. (describing multiple regional agreements between African countries
to combat wildlife crimes).
194. See PHILIPPE SANDS & JAQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW (3d ed. 2012). (discussing CITES framework to protect endan-
gered species).
195. Id. (describing protections afforded endangered species under CITES).
196. See Lindsay, supra note 20 (discussing differences in protection level be-
tween Appendix I and Appendix II listing).
197. See Sands & Peel supra note 195 (Discussing CITES amendments).
198. Id. (describing listing criteria for Appendix I protection under CITES).
199. Id. (describing Appendix II listing criteria).
200. Id. (describing low level of protection granted to Appendix III species).
201. Id. (discussing enforcement of CITES).
202. See Sands & Peel, supra note 195 (describing issues with enforcement of
CITES).
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national enforcement agencies and existing intergovernmental
bodies, particularly the World Customs Organization and ICPO-
Interpol.”203
In 1989, supporters tried to list the African elephant under Ap-
pendix I, but some opponents to this listing stated that the ele-
phant did not require such a listing and it would be too
protectionist.204  Some African countries disagree over the degree
of protection to afford elephants under CITES.205  Four nations in
Africa list the elephant as an Appendix II species while thirty-three
list the elephant as an Appendix I species.206  Thus, even the pro-
tection offered by CITES is not uniform throughout the African
elephant’s range.207
The “Conference of the Parties” (CoP) meets once every two
years in order to modify the agreement.208  The CITES 15th Con-
ference of the Parties (CoP15), held in Qatar in March 2010 re-
sulted in the creation of the African Elephant Action Plan by the
“Range States” of the African Elephant.209  Priority 1 of the plan
focuses on, “reduc[ing] illegal killing of elephants and illegal trade
in elephant products” and strategy 1.2 in support of this priority is
to “[h]armonize national policies and laws relevant to conservation
and management of African elephants within and across range
States where possible.”210  Priority Objective 6 similarly states the
goal to, “strengthen cooperation and understanding among range
States.”211  The thirty-eight parties to this agreement including
Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania have recognized the
need for more uniform wildlife laws but these goals have not been
met.212
203. Id. (discussing ways CITES has tried to improve enforcement).
204. Id. (describing history of African elephant protection under CITES).
205. See Lindsay, supra note 20 (noting that some African elephant range
states list elephant as Appendix II species while others list it as Appendix I species).
206. Id. (discussing protection afforded elephant under CITES).
207. Id. (discussing difference in protection afforded Appendix I species ver-
sus Appendix II species).
208. See Sands & Peel, supra note 195 (discussing procedures to update CITES
agreement).
209. See Lindsay, supra note 20 (discussing international agreements to pro-
tect elephant).
210. See CITES, supra note 181 (listing priorities followed by strategies for
achieving priorities).
211. Id. (listing priority objectives under action plan).
212. Id. (noting that Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia are signato-
ries to action plan).
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B. The United States
1. Ivory Market and Trafficking in the United States
The United States (U.S.) is one of the two largest markets for
ivory in the world along with China.213  In 2016, the Fish and Wild-
life Service made use of a rule making procedure under the Endan-
gered Species Act to implement a ban on interstate trade of ivory
and ivory products.214 The ban contains exemptions to this, how-
ever, for antiques and products with a small amount of ivory.215
The federal government banned the interstate sale of ivory,
but this does not restrict the sale within states themselves.216  Only
California, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and
Washington have banned the sale of ivory within their states.217
Without in-state bans on ivory, once in the state, traders can buy
and sell ivory legally.218  After the bans took effect in New York and
California—two of the largest U.S. markets for ivory—the markets
simply moved.219  The District of Columbia is now a major market
for ivory in the U.S.220  Like in other countries, the legal trade of
“antique” ivory can be used as a cover for illegal ivory.221 Eliminat-
ing the legal trade throughout all fifty states will remove any legal
cover for illegal traffickers in the U.S.222
213. See Colin Dwyer, China’s Ban on its Domestic Ivory Trade Takes Effect, NPR
.ORG (Jan. 1, 2018) https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/01/57495
2304/chinas-ban-on-its-domestic-ivory-trade-takes-effect (noting China and United
States have largest ivory markets and discussing their respective measures to ad-
dress issue).
214. See Fish and Wildlife Service, Administration Takes Bold Step for African Ele-
phant Conservation: Completes Near-Total Elephant Ivory Ban to Cut Off Opportunities for
Traffickers FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE PRESS RELEASE (June 2, 2016) https://www
.fws.gov/news/ShowNews.cfm?ref=administration-takes-bold-step-for-african-ele-
phant-conservation%3A-&_ID=35686#.V1BhTjFIG2Q.twitter (noting Obama ad-
ministration’s commitment to ending illegal ivory trade).
215. Id. (discussing new ban on ivory trade among states).
216. Id. (noting ivory sales have been banned between states but says nothing
about within single states).
217. See Rachael Bale, Why D.C. is the new hub for U.S. ivory sales, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC (July 27, 2018) https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/07/wild
life-watch-washington-elephant-ivory-for-sale-united-states/ (listing states with in
state ivory bans).
218. Id. (noting federal government has no control over instate sales of
ivory).
219. Id. (noting rise in ivory sales in D.C. after New York and California im-
pose stricter bans).
220. Id. (discussing rise in ivory sales in Washington D.C. and noting lack of
ban on ivory sales in D.C. besides federal restrictions).
221. Id. (discussing legal antique ivory market still in place).
222. See Bale, supra note 218 (noting legal antique market in U.S. is often
used to smuggle illegal ivory).
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Many states have considered ivory ban bills, but face strong op-
position.223  During the 2017 legislative session in Maryland, politi-
cians proposed legislation to ban in state sale of ivory, but the law
faced much disfavor and did not even make it to a floor vote.224
Opponents showed concern over not being able to trade antique
ivory goods.225  If the trade of ivory is to truly stop, states must start
implementing bans.226
2. The Lacey Act
a. Introduction
The Lacey Act remains the primary legal mechanism through
which the U.S. may prosecute individuals for violating wildlife laws
of other countries.227  Congress passed the Lacey Act in 1900 with
several amendments added in 1981 and 2008.228  Section 3372 of 16
U.S.C.A(2)(a) states that it is prohibited to “import, export, trans-
port, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign com-
merce—any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in
violation of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any
foreign law. . . .”229  The 2008 amendment further defined the term
“plant” in order to protect endangered flora as well as fauna.230
The Lacey Act makes it a crime in the United States to violate
the law of a foreign country.231  For example, the courts ruled that
the defendants in United States v. McNab were guilty of violating the
Lacey Act when transporting Caribbean spiny lobsters to Alabama
in violation of Honduran law.232  In order to violate the Lacey Act,
223. Author worked for the Humane Society in Maryland during 2017 and
lobbied for humane laws. (observing opposition to ivory ban bill during 2017 legis-
lative session in Maryland).
224. Id. (observing and lobbying for ivory ban bill during 2017 legislative ses-
sion in Maryland).
225. Id. (observing representatives cite concern over antique ivory sales).
226. See Bale, supra note 218 (discussing importance of state level ivory bans).
227. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378. (prohibiting import, export, or trade in wild-
life taken in violation of any domestic or international wildlife law).
228. See Fish and Wildlife Service, Lacey Act, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE INTER-
NATIONAL AFFAIRS https://www.fws.gov/international/laws-treaties-agreements/us-
conservation-laws/lacey-act.html. (discussing history of Lacey Act).
229. See supra note 228, § 3372 A(2)(a) (noting it is violation to trade in wild-
life species contrary to international law).
230. See Stephanie Eberhardt, Comment, The Lacey Act Amendments and United
States’ Policing of International Trade, 35 Hous. J. Int’l L. 397 (2013) (discussing 2008
amendment to Lacey Act).
231. Id. (noting purpose of Lacey Act).
232. See U.S. v. McNab, 324 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2003)(describing Lacey Act
offense committed by defendant).
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another law or regulation must have been violated first.233  The
Lacey Act thus seeks to punish American citizens for crimes com-
mitted in other states or countries in which the defendant other-
wise would not have been held accountable.234
b. Conspiracy charges
Not only can individuals be charged with violating foreign laws
under the Lacey Act, but they also can be charged with conspiracy
to violate such laws.235  According to the Model Penal Code § 5.03,
a conspiracy charge requires an agreement to commit a crime be-
tween two or more people.236  Therefore, the only act requirement
is an agreement.237 Some jurisdictions as well as the MPC require
an overt act requirement.238  An overt act is defined as an act “in
pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been
done by him or by a person with whom he conspired.”239  There-
fore, in order to be charged with a conspiracy crime under the
Lacey Act, an individual must have taken a step-in furtherance of
the goal of violating a foreign law or regulation.240  Conspiracy
charges are an essential deterrent to foreign wildlife law violations
as they allow prosecution before the law is actually violated.241
c. Predicate laws and regulations
The courts of the United States enforcing the Lacey Act have
found that the predicate laws must:242
1. Be valid laws or regulations,
2. Be published so as to give fair warning of illegality (does
not violate the rule of lenity),
3. Be valid law when the crime was committed.
233. See supra note 228, § 3372 (noting offense under Lacey is to import, ex-
port wildlife in violation of any law).
234. Id. (imposing liability for committing wildlife offense under foreign law).
235. See United States v. Molt, 599 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1979) (defendant
charged with conspiracy to violate wildlife laws).
236. See Model Penal Code § 5.03 (stating definition of conspiracy).
237. Id. (noting conspiracy charge requires an “agreement” between people
to commit a crime).
238. Id. (stating actual act is prerequisite for conspiracy charge).
239. Id. (stating definition of overt act requirement for conspiracy charge).
240. Id. (noting that defendant must take action in order to be charged with
conspiracy).
241. See Model Penal Code, supra note 237 (noting only act required for con-
spiracy charge is agreement to violate law; not actual violation of predicate law).
242. See infra notes 244-254 (noting requirements of predicate offense for
Lacey Act liability as evidenced in case law).
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The Court in U.S. v. Reeves found the predicate law must be
valid.243  Defendant Reeves violated his oystering permit in New
Jersey and sold his oysters across state lines.244  The court found
that the violation of the terms of the permit was not a violation of
any defined law or regulation.245  Therefore, there was no predicate
offense that subjected the defendant to prosecution under the
Lacey Act.246  The “any foreign law” language of the Lacey Act was
found to encompass regulations as well as statutes.247  In US v.
594,464 Pounds of Salmon, the Court found a violation of the Lacey
Act had been committed when the defendant exported salmon
without the permit required by regulations.248
Predicate laws for Lacey Act conviction must be published so as
to give fair warning to the defendant.249  In U.S. v. Cannon, the
Court found that predicate laws must be published, or the defen-
dant have actual notice of the regulation in accordance with the
federal Administrative Procedure Act.250  Finally, predicate laws
must be valid at the time of the alleged offense.251  The Ninth Cir-
cuit found in McNab that even though the Honduran government
later repealed the law that McNab was charged with violating pursu-
ant to his charges under the Lacey Act, he could still be held ac-
countable since the laws were valid at the time of the offense.252
The Court in McNab states, “[i]f the laws were valid in Honduras
during the time period covered by the indictment, the defendants
243. See U.S. v. Reeves, 891 F.Supp.2d 690 (D.N.J. 2012) (finding violation of
permit not to be adequate for Lacey Act liability).
244. Id. (discussing factual background of case and premise for Lacey Act
charge).
245. Id. (finding permit violation to not be violation of law as defined in
Lacey Act).
246. Id. (finding defendant did not violate any wildlife “law”).
247. See Trevor Krost, The World’s Laws in American Justice: The Foreign Law Pro-
visions of the 2008 Lacey Act Amendments, 8 PITT. J. ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH L. 55 (2013)
(discussing foreign law violations under Lacey Act and discussing U.S. v. 594,464
Pounds of Salmon, concerning violation of Chinese salmon regulation).
248. See United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.
1989) (finding violation of permitting regulation to qualify as predicate law for
Lacey Act charges).
249. See United States v. Cannon, 345 Fed.Appx. 301 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding
that Lacey Act conviction requires showing of actual notice or publication of predi-
cate wildlife law).
250. Id. (noting Administrative Procedures Act requires publication of statute
or regulation or actual knowledge of regulation).
251. See McNab, supra note 233 (finding defendant liable under Lacey Act
even though law is no longer valid because it was valid at time of offense).
252. Id. (discussing ruling of court).
27
Schenning: Transboundary Wildlife Laws and Trafficking: The Plight of the Af
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
66 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30: p. 39
violated the Lacey Act by importing the lobsters in violation of
those laws.”253
d. Penalties
Those in violation of the Lacey Act are subject to both civil and
criminal proceedings.254  The civil penalty for violation includes a
fine that “shall not exceed the maximum provided for violation of
said law, treaty, or regulation, or $10,000, whichever is less.”255  Sec-
tion 3373 of Title 16 of the U.S.C. states that anyone in violation of
the act could receive a fine or up to five years imprisonment.256
Section 3374 also mandates forfeiture of illegally taken wildlife or
plants.257  The forfeiture requirement under the Lacey Act is a
strict liability requirement.258  Ignorance of the foreign law cannot
provide a defense to the forfeiture requirement under the Lacey
Act.259
A violation of the Lacey Act can be either a misdemeanor or a
felony, depending on knowledge of illegality of the taking.260  The
mens rea necessary for a felony conviction is knowledge and carries
a fine of up to $250,000 for individuals.261
e. Scienter Requirements
The scienter requirement for a Lacey Act conviction is “knowl-
edge.”262  In order for a Lacey Act conviction to stand, the perpetra-
tor must have had the knowledge at the time of the offense that
their act or agreement to act was against the foreign law they are
charged with violating.263
253. Id. (noting predicate wildlife law must be valid at time of offense for
Lacey Act liability).
254. See Krost, supra note 248 (noting levels of liability under Lacey Act).
255. See supra note 228, § 3373 (describing civil penalties available under
Lacey Act).
256. Id. (discussing criminal penalties under Lacey Act).
257. See supra note 228, § 3374 (describing forfeiture provision of Lacey Act).
258. See United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131 (9th
Cir. 1982) (noting during forfeiture proceeding under Lacey Act culpability is not
considered).
259. See Krost, supra note 248 (discussing strict liability forfeiture component
of Lacey Act).
260. See Eberhardt, supra note 231 (discussing penalties and sanctions availa-
ble under Lacey Act).
261. Id. (noting felony conviction requires defendant to “knowingly” violate
Lacey Act).
262. Id. (finding for Lacey Act conviction defendant must knowingly break
wildlife law).
263. Id. (noting scienter requirement of Lacey Act).
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f. International Cooperation
The Lacey Act is unique in that the predicate offense is often
an offense under a foreign law.264  As a result, judges sitting in
courts in the U.S. are not experts on international law that defend-
ants in such cases are charged with violating.265  Many courts must
seek the counsel and expertise of foreign governments to ensure
accuracy when trying individuals for the crimes conducted in such
foreign countries.266  In addition, courts have sought counsel from
foreign jurisdictions in order to prosecute individuals under the
Lacey Act including the court in U.S. v. Molt in which the court
obtained legal advice from Fiji and Papa New Guinea.267  This en-
sures that the court properly understands and upholds the foreign
law in question.
g. Conclusion
The United States is one of the major markets for illegal ivory
along with China.268  The Lacey Act ensures that American citizens
do not violate or conspire with others to violate wildlife laws in
other countries.269  The conspiracy component to the Lacey Act is
important because it holds Americans responsible for the illegal
acts of others that supply Americans with illegal ivory or other wild-
life products.270
Further, the Lacey Act underscores the importance that coun-
tries have their own robust wildlife protection laws, especially where
these highly endangered and sought-after animals reside.271  The
laws of Eastern and Southern African countries are especially criti-
cal to the protection of the African elephant under the Lacey
Act.272  Therefore, in order to prevent Americans (or others in con-
cert with Americans) from violating Malawi law in order to obtain
264. Id. (discussing foreign law component of Lacey Act).
265. See Molt, supra note 235 (noting court sought expertise on foreign law
during Lacey Act case).
266. Id. (noting expert witness testifying to state of law in Fiji).
267. Id. (noting court used expert witnesses to testify about purpose and char-
acteristics of foreign laws).
268. See supra notes 214-26 (noting United States has large illegal ivory market
compounded by lack of intrastate ivory bans).
269. See supra notes 227-41 (discussing Lacey Act predicate laws and conspir-
acy charges).
270. See supra notes 235-41 (discussing conspiracy charges under Lacey Act).
271. See supra notes 242-53 (discussing culpability for violating foreign laws).
272. See supra notes 242-53 (discussing foreign law provision under Lacey
Act); and see figure 1 (showing range states of African elephants).
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ivory, Malawi must have strict anti-poaching laws.273  Due to the mi-
gratory nature of the African elephant, border countries must also
have strict anti-poaching laws in order to protect Malawian ele-
phants.274  For example, even if an elephant in Kasungu National
Park in Western Malawi were adequately protected under Malawi
law, this same Malawian elephant would face serious risk by crossing
the man-made border into Zambia because the level of protection
differs in Zambia.275  This further highlights the need for coopera-
tion between nations concerning wildlife protections.276
3. Big Game Hunting: Current Issues in the United States
Big game hunting came to the forefront of the American con-
science in 2015 with the slaying of Cecil the Lion in Zimbabwe.277
American hunter, Dr. Walter Palmer, lured the fabled lion out of a
protected national park to kill the animal in unprotected terri-
tory.278  Charges were never brought against the American hunter
by the Zimbabwean government because he had a permit, making
the hunting of the lion technically legal in the country.279  Theo
Bronkhorst, a local hunter, was charged, however, with conducting
an illegal hunt for luring Cecil out of a protected area, but these
charges were dropped.280  Reports state that Palmer paid over
$50,000 to hunt Cecil.281  Dr. Palmer was forced to close his dental
273. See supra notes 242-53 (noting prosecution under Lacey Act requires vio-
lation of predicate state, federal, or foreign law).
274. See supra notes 178-93 (discussing regional agreements between African
nations to protect elephants).
275. See supra notes 194-212 (describing differing levels of protection afforded
under CITES).
276. See supra notes 178-94 (describing regional agreements to protect ele-
phant); and see supra notes 46-56 (discussing transboundary nature of elephants).
277. See Katie Rogers, American Hunter Killed Cecil, Beloved Lion Who Was Lured
Out of His Sanctuary, THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 28, 2015). https://www.nytimes
.com/2015/07/29/world/africa/american-hunter-is-accused-of-killing-cecil-a-be
loved-lion-in-zimbabwe.html (discussing public outcry after Cecil’s death including
thousands signing petition to Zimbabwean president asking for repercussions).
278. Id. (discussing controversy of illegal lion hunt in Zimbabwe).
279. See Kate Samuelson, Zimbabwe Court Drops Charges Against Hunter Accused
of Helping to Kill Cecil the Lion, TIME (November 11, 2016) http://time.com/
4568218/charges-hunter-cecil-the-lion/ (noting charges were not brought against
American hunter but were brought against local hunter that lured Cecil from pro-
tected area).
280. Id. (noting all charges were dropped against hunters in Cecil hunting
controversy).
281. See Rogers, supra note 278 (discussing amount Palmer paid for permits to
hunt big game species).
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office due to public outcry and to take down his business’s
website.282
Dr. Palmer and other big game hunters even go so far as to
claim that big game hunting helps conservation efforts and sup-
ports local communities.283  These claims are contested, however,
by most conservationists.284  The trophy hunting business employs
only a small amount of people and a very small amount of the li-
cense fee actually goes to the community.285  The trophy hunting
industry amounts to a mere two percent of the tourism industry.286
Hunters claim that the selling of hunting licenses for thousands of
dollars monetarily supports the animals they pay to kill.287
The status of the African Elephant has been seriously threated
under the Trump administration.288  In November 2017 President
Trump announced a lifting of the ban of elephant trophy importa-
tion into the United States.289  The Fish and Wildlife Service
claimed that “[l]egal, well-regulated sport hunting as part of a
sound management program can benefit certain species by provid-
ing incentives to local communities to conserve those species and
by putting much-needed revenue back into conservation.”290  Yet,
studies show that Zimbabwe and Zambia have management plans
that are far from adequate and this problem is compounded by cor-
ruption concerns.291
The reversal of the trophy ban would have allowed elephant
trophies to be imported to the United States from Zimbabwe and
Zambia.292  Trump later reversed this decision due to public outcry,
282. Id. (describing public outrage over controversial Cecil hunt).
283. Id. (noting that big game hunters claim funds generated from hunting
licenses ensure survival of endangered species).
284. See Morell, supra note 164 (noting conservationists and the International
Union for the Conservation of Nature disagree with big game hunters that hunting
helps conserve species).
285. Id. (discussing what actually happens with funds from hunting fees).
286. Id. (noting hunting funds do not contribute as much to tourism
revenue).
287. Id. (noting hunters still claim funds from licenses significantly contribute
to conservation efforts).
288. See Laurel Wamsley, Trump Keeps Elephant Trophy Import Ban in Place, For
Now, NPR (November 16, 2017) https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/
11/16/564712084/u-s-lifts-ban-on-importing-elephant-trophies-from-zimbabwe-
and-zambia (noting Trump lifted ivory trophy ban from certain countries).
289. See id. (discussing Trump policy concerning elephant trophy ban).
290. Id. (discussing recent plans to allow for trophy hunting imports to
United States from Zimbabwe and Zambia).
291. Id. (discussing reality of removing elephant trophy ban for elephant
populations in Zimbabwe and Zambia).
292. Id. (noting specifics of plan to lift ivory ban).
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stating via Twitter that “all conservation facts” would be consid-
ered.293  Ryan Zinke (Interior Secretary) issued a statement that the
issuance of permits would be put on hold.294  Not four months
later, Trump has lifted the ban once again. President Trump even
stated after reinstating the ban on elephant trophies that “he would
be ‘very hard-pressed’ to change his opinion ‘that this horror show
in any way helps conservation of elephants or any other animal.’”295
Yet, Trump has once again lifted the ban on elephant trophies.296
On March 1, 2018 the Fish and Wildlife Service announced that
they will now consider elephant trophy imports on a “case by case”
basis.297  When questioned about how the money for trophies
would supposedly help conservation efforts, Trump even admitted
that the funds were unlikely to go to conservation efforts due to
corruption.298
One could question Trump’s motives for reversing the ban on
trophies.299  His own sons are notorious big game hunters, known
for hunting endangered species in Africa.300  One of his sons has
even been photographed next to a dead elephant, holding its
tail.301  Even during the campaign, President Trump spoke of his
own love of hunting.302
The D.C. Circuit found that the 2014 enhancement findings of
the Fish and Wildlife Service (restrictions placed on elephant tro-
phy importation from Zimbabwe) were invalid because they did not
adhere to notice-and-comment requirements.303  Thus, in a memo-
randum the Fish and Wildlife Service released on March 1, 2018
293. See Wamsley, supra note 289 (discussing policy change due to public op-
position to lifting ivory ban).
294. Id. (discussing announcement made by Secretary of Interior concerning
ivory trophy ban).
295. See Joseph Hincks, President Trump Once Criticized the ‘Horror Show’ of Tro-
phy Hunting. Now He’s Lifting a Ban on Elephant Part Imports, TIME (March 7, 2018)
http://time.com/5188989/elephant-trophy-ban-fws/ (discussing Trump tweet
pulling back from original position on ivory trophy imports).
296. Id. (noting Trump’s change in position concerning trophies).
297. Id. (discussing new announcement concerning trophy imports).
298. Id. (noting Trump himself conceded fact that much of funds generated
from hunting permits are unlikely to go to conservation).
299. See Kerry Lauerman, The Trump Sons Go Hunting Again. Will More Trophy
Photos Follow?, THE WASHINGTON POST (August 6, 2016) https://www.washington
post.com/news/animalia/wp/2016/08/06/the-trump-sons-go-hunting-again-will-
more-trophy-photos-follow/?utm_term=.610b49b1480a (discussing Trump’s sons’
proclivity for trophy hunting big game species).
300. Id. (discussing Trump’s personal ties to trophy hunting).
301. Id. (noting controversial photo of Trump’s son with hunted elephant).
302. Id. (noting Trump went to Iowa to hunt pheasants).
303. See Safari Club International v. Zinke, 878 F.3d 316 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (dis-
cussing finding that 2014 negative enhancement findings were invalid and discuss-
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the service withdrew ESA enhancement findings for African Ele-
phants in Zimbabwe, along with several other enhancement find-
ings for other species and nations.304  This effectively removed
management plans for these species without any mention of a re-
placement.305  As of March 2018, President Trump has reversed the
elephant trophy ban twice, indicating the uncertain protection sta-
tus for the species in the United States.306
C. The Chinese Market and Regulations
1. 2018 Ivory Ban
In December 2017, the ban on ivory in China officially went
into force.307  This means that China has now closed all of its ivory
factories and shops, well over 150 combined.308  This is a crucial
step, not only to eliminate legal ivory but also to stop the trade of
illegal ivory.309  In accordance with CITES, China bought a sixty-two
ton reserve of ivory in 2008 in an attempt to fill the demand for
ivory in China with legal ivory and not poached ivory.310  The effect,
however, was the opposite of what was intended.311  This influx of
legal ivory only spurred the overall demand and provided a guise
for illegal traffickers.312  The closing of the legal market will make it
ing 2014 negative enhancement findings that found trophy hunting negatively
affected elephants).
304. See Fish and Wildlife Service, Withdrawal of Certain Findings for ESA-listed
Species Taken as Sport Hunted Trophies, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
(March 1, 2018) https://www.fws.gov/international/pdf/memo-withdrawal-of-cer
tain-findings-ESA-listed-species-sport-hunted-trophies.pdf (discussing withdrawal of
enhancement findings for elephants in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana,
Namibia, and South Africa).
305. Id. (noting removal of findings with no mention of replacement).
306. See supra notes 289-307 (discussing Trump’s multiple reversals of ele-
phant trophy ban).
307. See Simon Denyer, Ivory Sales in China Finally End this Month. But Elephants
Aren’t Safe Yet, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2017)  https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/ivory-sales-in-china-finally-end-this-monthbutelephantsarentyetsafe/
2017/12/14/7b09d800e08d11e79eb6e3c7ecfb4638_story.html?utm_term=.652ea0
b0ecd8 (discussing Ivory trade in China and recent ban).
308. See John Sudworth, Can China’s Ivory Trade Ban Save Elephants?, BBC
(Mar. 31, 2017) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-39440486 (noting le-
gal ivory trade has been banned in China resulting in closure of thirty-four facto-
ries and 138 shops).
309. Id. (noting legal ivory trade in China spurred illegal ivory market).
310. Id. (discussing China’s ill-advised attempt to fill demand by selling stock-
piled ivory).
311. Id. (describing how flooding legal market with stockpiled ivory resulted
in surge in illegal market).
312. Id. (noting adverse effects of selling stockpiled ivory in China).
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impossible for illegal traffickers to pass off their ivory as legal.313
Some question, however, what the government will do with their
stockpiles of ivory and whether the allowance of trade in ivory anti-
ques will still provide a loophole for traffickers.314
In early 2018, Hong Kong banned the sale of ivory.315  Even
though Hong Kong was a party to the CITES convention, the sale of
hunting trophies and antique ivory were still legal until 2018.316
Even though the legal ivory market in China officially closed last
year, many were traveling to Hong Kong to purchase ivory.317
Therefore, the closing of the Hong Kong ivory market is especially
crucial.318
Not only is transboundary coordination of laws important to
protect elephants on the ground in Africa, so too is it important at
the other end of the trafficking spectrum.319  The ivory market and
demand in China will not be gone simply because there is a ban on
ivory in the country.320  Some fear that with the ban in China, con-
sumers will merely look to neighboring countries without such laws
in order to find ivory.321 This was already occurring with the market
in Hong Kong until it was finally closed.322 Reporters note that,
with the ban in China, the ivory markets of neighboring countries
are thriving including Laos which is becoming one of the leading
313. See Sudworth, supra note 309 (noting legal market provided cover for
illegal ivory).
314. Id. (discussing continued concerns over illegal ivory market despite re-
cent ban on legal market).
315. See Nick Visser, A Great Day for Elephants: Hong Kong Votes to Ban All Ivory
Sales, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2018) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ent
ry/hong-kong-ivory-sales_us_5a7265f5e4b05253b2757850?utm_hp_ref=animal-
rights (noting Hong Kong allowed for trade in antique ivory and import of hunt-
ing trophies; thus, had major illegal ivory market as illegal ivory was passed off as
antique).
316. Id. (discussing legal ivory trade in Hong Kong).
317. Id. (noting that most people who buy ivory in Hong Kong are from
China where legal market has now closed).
318. Id. (noting many simply went to Hong Kong to buy ivory after market in
China closed).
319. Id. (finding countries with less strict ivory bans or none at all provide
loopholes for continued buying and selling of ivory across Asia).
320. See Colin Dwyer, China’s Ban on it’s Domestic Ivory Trade Takes Effect, NPR
(Jan. 1, 2018) https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/01/5749523
04/chinas-ban-on-its-domestic-ivory-trade-takes-effect (noting legal market may
shift to neighboring countries, allowing for traffickers to smuggle illegal ivory).
321. Id. (noting other Asian countries must ban ivory trade or trade will just
shift to other countries from China).
322. See Visser, supra note 316 (finding ninety percent of ivory purchasers in
Hong Kong were from China).
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ivory markets in Asia.323  As figure three shows, China borders sev-
eral other countries some of which do not enforce ivory bans, mak-
ing ivory trafficking relatively easy.324
Figure 3: China and its border
A recent report by TRAFFIC indicates that Malaysia is also a
key player in the trafficking of elephant products in Asia.325
Though Malaysia’s role is purely a transitory one, the amount of
ivory making it through its ports is simply staggering.326  In an
eleven-year period from 2003-2014, sixty-six seizures of ivory were
linked to Malaysia totaling 63,419kg.327  Malaysia has even been
named the principal transit point for African ivory headed to Asian
markets.328  Though not a source state nor a major ivory market in
323. See Alastair Leithead, Laos is ‘World’s Fastest Growing’ Ivory Market, BBC
(Sept. 28, 2017) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41432963 (discussing
booming ivory trade in other Asian countries after Chinese ivory ban).
324. Id. (noting Laos does not police illegal ivory trade and does not have
much interest in doing so).
325. See Kanitha Krishnasamy, Malaysia key conduit in global illegal ivory trade,
TRAFFIC (Sept. 1, 2016) http://www.traffic.org/home/2016/9/8/malaysia-key-
conduit-in-global-illegal-ivory-trade.html (discussing Malaysia’s role in illegal ivory
trade).
326. Id. (finding 63,419 kg of ivory have been moved through Malaysia from
2003 to 2014).
327. Id. (noting large amount of ivory being moved through Malaysia on its
way from Africa to Asian markets).
328. Id. (noting Malaysia is principle transit point from ivory coming from
Africa going to Asia).
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itself, Malaysia is in a unique position to combat the illegal ivory
trade within its own borders.329
2. Enforcement
Serious questions remain as to whether China is equipped to
enforce its ban on the trade in ivory.330  The trade in rhino horn
has been officially banned in China for years with heavy penalties
for offenders.331  However, rhino horn is still readily available for
those who seek it.332  Even with the ban, a significant market re-
mains with a culture that sometimes values ivory over elephants.333
Enforcement of the ban is concerning due to a history of a lack
of enforcement of other environmental laws in China.334  For exam-
ple, enforcement of chemical regulations usually only occurs after
safety or environmental accidents.335  Also problematic for enforce-
ment is the fact that multiple agencies often manage the same envi-
ronmental problem/regulation.336  For example, over ten different
agencies have management duties and responsibilities under the
chemical regulations legislation in China.337  Another issue is the
lack of environmental knowledge of judges in the judiciary in
China.338  According to Ferris and Wolfson, “. . . China’s State
Council observed in 2005 that ‘it is not uncommon that environ-
mental laws are not fully observed or strictly enforced.’”339  China’s
poor track record of environmental enforcement combined with a
329. Id. (finding Malaysia’s role in illegal ivory trade is transitory and CITES
identified Malaysia as country of ‘primary concern’).
330. See infra notes 335-341 (discussing China’s issues with environmental
enforcement).
331. See Sudworth, supra note 21 (noting trade in rhino horn has been
banned for more than twenty years in China).
332. Id. (noting rhino can easily be bought and sold on the internet).
333. Id. (finding rhino horn is easily obtainable with little risk involved in
buying or selling).
334. See Tad Ferris and Steve Wolfson, China, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE LAWS OF THE PLANET (2014) (noting lack of
enforcement of air emissions standards).
335. Id. (noting enforcement of chemical regulations usually only occurs after
accident).
336. Id. at 744. (noting ten different agencies in charge of regulating
chemicals).
337. See Ferris and Wolfson, supra note 335 (noting there is no organization
that has overall authority over chemical regulations).
338. Id. (noting judges have little training on complex environmental issues
and government has invested very little in these skills).
339. Id. (noting China’s own state council noted that environmental laws are
not fully enforced).
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continuing demand for ivory does not bode well for the success of
the ivory ban.340
VI. CONCLUSION
The illegal trade in ivory has had devastating effects on the Af-
rican elephant across its range.341  Not only is the elephant a key-
stone species, but they are an ecosystem engineer that many other
species rely on to shape the environment.342  The transboundary
nature of the elephant requires that range countries, including
Malawi, make efforts to coordinate their wildlife laws and protec-
tions.343  It is only through coordination that wildlife laws will be
effective.344  Coordination of laws is also required at the other end
of the trafficking issue.345  We have continued to see countries ban
the sale of ivory within their boundaries.346  This will all be in vain,
however, if some countries continue to allow the sale of ivory, thus
simply shifting the market.347  The fate of the elephant has not yet
been sealed but quick action must be taken across the globe to save
the species from the brink of extinction.348
340. See supra notes 335-341 (discussing environmental enforcement issues in
China).
341. See supra notes 20-31 (discussing decline in elephant populations due to
illegal ivory trade).
342. See supra notes 32-45 (discussing ecological importance of African
elephant).
343. See supra notes 46-56 (discussing migratory nature of African elephant).
344. See supra notes 195-202 (discussing differing levels of protection for ele-
phants in Africa).
345. See supra notes 308-341 (discussing ivory markets in Asia).
346. See supra notes 308-341 (discussing ivory bans in Hong Kong and China).
347. See supra notes 308-341 (discussing how ivory markets shift to countries
that have yet to ban ivory or have poor enforcement).
348. See supra notes 20-31 (discussing decline in elephant populations across
Africa).
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